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Wednesday, August 5, 2020 | History

3 edition of Optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption found in the catalog.

Optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption

Andrew B. Abel

Optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption

by Andrew B. Abel

  • 341 Want to read
  • 31 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Taxation,
  • Consumption (Economics)

  • Edition Notes

    StatementAndrew B. Abel.
    SeriesNBER working paper series -- no. 10099., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 10099.
    ContributionsNational Bureau of Economic Research.
    The Physical Object
    Pagination65 p. :
    Number of Pages65
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL17617927M
    OCLC/WorldCa53828649

      is socially optimal due to the key distinguishing feature of our framework Œthe entry mechanism based on C.E.S. preferences. Moreover, e¢ ciency also requires that markups be synchronized across goods, as we show by making the labor supply choice endogenous but assuming that, di⁄erently from the consumption good, leisure is not subject to a. B) the country with the smaller initial level of output per worker will grow more rapidly than the country with the greater initial level of output per worker. C) both countries will have the same growth rates of output per worker, even if they start out with different levels of output per worker.

    Consumers’ budget constraint in the rst period is: c + s = y t; where s > 0 implies that the consumer is saving (buying the bond), s consumer is borrowing (selling the bond), y t is the consumer’s disposable income after tax. A bond issued with face value syields a .   Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption NBER Working Paper No. w Number of pages: 67 Posted: 17 Nov Last Revised: 07 Aug

    A Pigovian tax (also spelled Pigouvian tax) is a tax on any market activity that generates negative externalities (costs not included in the market price). The tax is intended to correct an undesirable or inefficient market outcome (a market failure), and does so by being set equal to the external marginal cost of the negative cost include private cost and external cost.   The optimal capital income tax rate here is, which is essentially just the sum of the optimal capital tax rates that arise due to just the hours distortion (in the second row of Table 5) and just welfare heterogeneity (in the second row of Table 3). Thus, it seems heterogeneity and the hours distortion have somewhat additive implications for.


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Optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption by Andrew B. Abel Download PDF EPUB FB2

Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption Andrew B. Abel∗ The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and National Bureau of Economic Research First version: February This version: November Abstract I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in.

In the model I present here, in which consumers live for two periods (and the benchmarks depend on the contemporaneous rather than the lagged consumption of others), there are benchmark levels of consumption in both periods of a consumer's life and the optimal tax rate on capital could be negative, positive, or zero, as illustrated by Cited by: Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption Andrew B.

Abel NBER Working Paper No. November JEL No. E21, H31 ABSTRACT I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer's utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted av erage of consumption by others (the Cited by: Andrew B.

Abel, "Optimal Taxation when Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol.

BibTeX @MISC{Abel05optimaltaxation, author = {Andrew B. Abel and Martin Gervais and Carlos Garriga}, title = {Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption,” The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {}}. I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer's utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted average of consumption by others (the benchmark level of consumption) as well as on the level of the consumer's own consumption.

The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the Modified Golden Rule and by a condition on the. Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption,” The Review of Economic Studies.

as well as on the level of the consumer’s own consumption. The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the ModiÞed Golden Rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each.

BibTeX @MISC{Dupor_optimaltaxation, author = {I Thank Bill Dupor and Joao Gomes and Helpful Discussion and Martin Gervais and Andrew B. Abel}, title = {Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption}, year = {}}. Andrew B. Abel, "Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo Note: EFG PE. Optimal Taxation when Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption. (the benchmark level of consumption) as well as on the level of the consumer's own consumption.

The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the Modified Golden Rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each. This paper invesigates the optimal compensation scheme for workers in a team who value not only absolute but also relative incomes.

A worker is said to be more Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption. Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Benchmark Levels of Consumption. Get this from a library. Optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption.

[Andrew B Abel; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption Andrew B.

Abel The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and National Bureau of Economic Research First version: February ; This version: February Abstract I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in.

However, the optimal tax rule is not that simple if the bargaining power is endogenous. From and, we have the following ranking of the optimal tax rates: (28) r 1 − r 2 = 1 − ω ε 22 − ε 11 2 α + β α + β β ε 11 ε 22 2 α + β − α 2 ε 11 + ε 22 + 1 + ω θ − 1 2 θ 1 − θ + ω α β 1 2 − θ 2 ε 11 ε 22 2 α + β.

Published: Abel, Andrew B. "Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels Of Consumption," Review of Economic Studies,v72(,Jan), Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:Cited by: 2. Abel AB () Optimal taxation when consumers have endogenous benchmark levels of consumption.

Rev Eco Stud 1– Article; Google Scholar. The relative preference for environmental quality δ is set at such that consumption is slightly more important than environmental quality in old age. The parameters governing the dynamics of environmental quality are set with the following values: κ c =κ m = and b = The value of κ c implies that one tenth of total consumption is transformed into pollution.

Abel, A. "Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption." Review of Economic Stud no. 1 (): 21– Aiyagari, S. "Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing Constraints, and Constant Discounting." Journal of Political Economyno.

6 (): – Using an overlapping generations model in which human capital accumulation has positive external effects on the production of the human capital of future generations, this paper analyzes implications of agents’ having preferences for educational status, represented by human capital holdings relative to the social average.

Examining the value and sign of the optimal distortionary tax in the. Equity Premia with Benchmark Levels of Consumption: Closed-Form Results Optimal Capital Income Taxation. Article. Full-text available.

Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous. Using optimal tax policy as our field of application, we highlight a new source of endogeneity. It arises under multidimensional heterogeneity, because optimal tax formulas are then expressed as functions of weighted means of sufficient statistics computed at the individual level and the weights are endogenous to the tax.

Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption By Andrew B. Abel.(A) Individual consumers’ demands for products can be aggregated and represented by a consumption function. Furthermore, consumption is completely determined by disposable income (Y - t 0Y) (where "t 0" is a given flat tax rate which is constant across all income levels).

Then, we can write C = c 0 + MPC(Y-t 0Y), where c.